T o draw a line from F. R. Leavis to Bruno Latour would be to trace how the concept of the "great novel" features in literary criticism's recent de-privileging of the human (Latour, "Agency" 9). For Leavis, of course, novels that earned a place in the Great Tradition captured the essentially moral and psychological characteristics of human life; they demonstrated a "reverent openness" before such life and an awareness of its possibilities (9).
the "interpretation of machines" and gives voice to the hybrid entities generating and generated by technological innovation (Aramis viii).
Latour's example of a "great novel" is Leo Tolstoy's War and Peace (1867). The lengthy nineteenth-century novel with its many-threaded plots seems a likely choice because it is sensitive to what Charles Dickens called the "connexion . . . between many people in the innumerable histories of this world, who, from opposite sides of great gulfs are curiously brought together" (Bleak House [1852-53] 235 ). Such connections are in turn enabled by manifold agentic forces in which the human does not assume any special status.
Indeed, in Dickens's writing, connection is assisted by what Hippolyte Taine described as "an enthusiasm . . . that will make a sort of human" out of a "vulgar object" (339). These forces and sources of social realignment therefore include everything from the petty objects of everyday life to the newly-invented contraptions that feed and further industrialization and empire. The first half of this essay will consider works by Dickens and George Eliot to show how non-human entities, particularly machines, enable forms of physical and psychological connection that make it possible for their novels to have such enormous social reach. I will focus on the train as one kind of machine that accrues agency and transformatively mediates relations among numerous other actors within far-reaching social and sympathetic networks. The second half will turn to a self-described "lesser" novel, Samuel Butler's Erewhon (1872) , written and set in a British colony. In this story, machines, including trains, are extensions of human bodies and as a result become motive-driven agentic beings. Yet such beings do not in this novel forge new connections in the social realm or broaden the scope of sympathy as non-human entities do in, for example, Eliot's longer novels. Instead, the intertwining of human and machine in Erewhon results ultimately in an abstraction and reification of the European human as a "made man." Correspondingly, this process makes way for the dispossession and exploitation of the indigenous figures in the novel, who become less than human in a decidedly hierarchical chain of being.
In this context, my use of the terms "great" (or for Eliot, "serious") and "minor" or "lesser" is not evaluative, but rather identifies how the authors and critics I am discussing represent networked relations between the human and non-human. I will argue that the relative narrative poverty of Butler's Erewhon can be read as an expression of resistance to imperial, machinemediated networks and the abstractions of value that they make possible in the labor of colonial adventurers. The made men who discover a wealth and security in the colonies that they lacked in the metropole, the novel shows, rely on a vast imperial infrastructure in which complex relations between human and machine actors make it possible for goods and capital to move rapidly around the globe. In this interpretation, the shame that Butler professes about his novel's feeble plot and thinly-drawn characters appears somewhat disingenuous, for Erewhon is deliberately rejecting the rich agentic networks of what Latour identifies as the "great novel."
Butler's novel teaches us that our current critical romance with antianthropocentric, actor-network-rich forms of representation forgets how a flat ontology may play out in the history of colonial capital and empire. Even as we have learned to read against a metaphysics that elevates the human above other entities, or that ignores the entanglements of human subjects with non-human objects, we need to remain alert to the histories in which the human and the non-human find definition and agency. The point here is not to correct Latour, for whom our habitual and philosophical quarantining of subjects from objects has meant "withdrawing historicity from the [objective] world" ("Agency" 13).
Rather, it is to attend to the historicity of network itself. Through its "minor" form, I propose, Erewhon attempts to do exactly that.
Latour himself reads Erewhon as a cautionary parable about the segregation of non-human agents from the realms of human passions and politics. In the story, the Erewhonians-an isolated society hidden in the Southern Alps of New Zealand-believe that evolution spells the eventual enslavement of humanity to the machine. Ultimately, they prophesy, technology will arrive at such a point that it will render humans mere parasites on the very inventions they have brought to life. Persuaded that they must do everything they can to prevent the monstrous eventuality of the post-human future, the Erewhonians destroy all of their machines, or else quarantine them in museums and imprison or execute anyone suspected of using them. In Aramis, or the Love of Technology (1993), Latour turns Erewhon into a cautionary allegory about the silencing of technology. As a means of giving voice to the machine, his account of the failure of Paris's plan for a personalized rapid transit system ("The Aramis") in the 1970s and 1980s includes a mish-mash of engineers' reports, interviews, newspaper articles, technical documents, and other media to augment the fictional exchange between an engineer and a Sociology professor about the demise of the project. This assembly of voices (one whose use of documentary fragments is novelistic in the style of Bram Stoker's Dracula [1897]) aspires to " [restore] freedom to all the realities involved before any one of them could succeed in unifying the others" (Aramis ix). It aims to animate the machine by identifying the enormous cast of actors-or, more properly, actants, since their agency does not imply consciousness-that first brought Aramis to life and then condemned it to death. VICTORIAN STUDIES / VOLUME 60, NO. 1
Aramis therefore is intended to read as a "great novel" in Latour's sense of the term. It brings together a disparate collection of events, plans, accidents, and ambitions that together create a historical drama, in this instance with a non-human protagonist at its center. This form of narrative looks back to eighteenth-century speaking "it-narratives" (narrated by coins, banknotes, and pins). But it also recalls voluminous nineteenth-century narratives, such as Dickens's Our Mutual Friend (1865) , where discarded matter helps to drive the human plot and lies at the heart of a complex social web; or it invokes, as I shall discuss below, the networks of sympathy in Eliot's novels that ultimately challenge human autonomy. Rather than pointing mutely to the post-human future-as Latour suggests the Erewhonian machines do-Aramis, like these capacious nineteenth-century precursors, seeks out and gives voice to nonhuman entities within a tangle of actants.
Victorianists have long been interested in narrative representations of non-human objects. Victorian drawing rooms remind us, as John Plotz has put it, how Victorians "loved their things," as well as how these very things confirmed, expanded, and mobilized domestic English identity in an age of imperial expansion (1). Zealand, the novel shows us how these mechanical entities become mobilized within imperial networks precisely because they carry an agency that is at once independent of human will and desire, and also capable of acting upon these.
Butler reminds us that, even as we try to respect their ontologies and recognize our entanglements with them, such entities are easily reabsorbed into the stream of capital. Despite the richly interwoven plots of realist novels, then,
Erewhon is paradoxically more alert to the colonial dimensions of narrativized networks than its more dilatory and metropolitan literary cousins.
The perpetual entanglement of human and non-human agents is richly portrayed in what might be described as the great novels of the global North. I will begin with works by Dickens and Eliot that foreground the role of machines and other non-humans in actor networks, even where the network is the conduit for distinctly human experiences and exchanges of sympathy. The narrative consciousness of these novels outdistances, even rejects, a humanism that locates narrative authority in the mind. In an implicit challenge to these ambitious narrative forms, I will argue, Erewhon shows how networks that embrace the motives and machinations of the non-human may not be innocent of human desire and design. Despite its superficial satire on the narrow vision of an anti-modern, machine-phobic culture, Erewhon can be read as skeptical of the anti-humanist, network-sensitive reach of the great novel. Reading
Butler's story carefully can give us pause before we inadvertently re-invoke the Great Tradition, this time for works of art in which "networks . . . link people and objects" across great distances (Levine 21).
Novels and Trains
Latour's reading of War and Peace focuses on the passage in which Prince Kutuzov decides to begin military engagement. Here, what the narrator calls "inevitable movement" and "accomplished facts" are recognizably assemblages of a vast number of events preceding the decision (qtd. in Latour, "Agency" 9).
It is this awareness of his own lack of autonomy that actually enables Kutuzov to defeat Napoleon Bonaparte, whose megalomania is ultimately the cause of his defeat. In this passage, subjects and objects become confused because agency is not aligned discretely with a decision-making subject. Such "common ground of agency," usually unexamined, is captured in the novel that tracks apparently individually-motivated decisions to a multitude of actions, including those that have taken place at a great distance ("Agency" 8).
As The railway, at this point, knowingly shutting a green eye and opening a red one, they had to run for it. As Bella could not run easily so wrapped up, the Secretary had to help her. When she took her opposite place in the carriage corner, the brightness in her face was so charming to behold, that on her exclaiming, "What beautiful stars and what a glorious night!" the Secretary said "Yes," but seemed to prefer to see the night and the stars in the light of her lovely little countenance, to looking out of the window.
O boofer lady, fascinating boofer lady! If I were but legally executor of Johnny's will! If I had but the right to pay your legacy and to take your receipt!-Something to this purpose surely mingled with the blast of the train as it cleared the stations, all knowingly shutting up their green eyes and opening their red ones when they prepared to let the boofer lady pass. (594) I have suggested elsewhere that this passage liberates the narrative voice from the consciousness of the human characters, who seem only dimly aware of their blossoming passion. Instead, narrative intuition is distributed among the "knowing" train stations, blasting train horn, winking lights, and the spirit of a dead child who once named Bella the "boofer lady." 5 Here, clearly, there is no discrete, individual human awareness unfolding against a background of dead or otherwise inanimate objects. Nor is this quite an instance of the AUTUMN 2017 pathetic fallacy gone mad, in which life and humanity is drained out of people by things, as Dorothy Van Ghent described in Dickens. 6 Instead, knowing non-human objects take the place of an omniscient, organizing narrator, foretelling connections soon to be revealed among disparate characters and events.
This narrative device does more than simply animate and anthropomorphize non-human entities. For the railway and the ghost are both "quasi subjects"
("Agency" 5); they share awareness and-given the sequence of events that will precipitate the couple's union-agency with the human subjects who, like them, are no longer (if indeed they ever were) autonomous entities.
Similarly, in Dombey and Son (1848) the (demonic rather than benevolent)
figure of the train seems at first to be a projection of human feeling. In bitterness at the death of his son, Mr. Dombey finds "a likeness to his misfortune everywhere" (312). In his mind, the train's inexorable rush towards its destination becomes a modern incarnation of a scythe-wielding Death. The scenes that flash before the eyes of the passengers are only so many forms of life that will inevitably be cut down:
Breasting the wind and light, the shower and sunshine, away, and still away, it rolls and roars, fierce and rapid, smooth and certain, and great works and massive bridges crossing up above, fall like a beam of shadow an inch broad, upon the eye, and then are lost. Away, and still away, onward and onward ever: glimpses of cottage-homes, of houses, mansions, rich estates, of husbandry and handicraft, of people, of old roads and paths that look deserted, small, and insignificant as they are left behind: and so they do, and what else is there but such glimpses, in the track of the indomitable monster, Death! Away, with a shriek, and a roar, and a rattle, plunging down into the earth again, and working on in such a storm of energy and perseverance, that amidst the darkness and whirlwind the motion seems reversed, and to tend furiously backward, until a ray of light upon the wet wall shows its surface flying past like a fierce stream, away once more into the day, and through the day, with a shrill yell of exultation, roaring, rattling, tearing on, spurning everything with its dark breath, sometimes pausing for a minute where a crowd of faces are, that in a minute more are not; sometimes lapping water greedily, and before the spout at which it drinks has ceased to drip upon the ground, shrieking, roaring, rattling through the purple distance! (311-12) "The power that force[s] itself upon its iron way" is apparently a figment of Dombey's tortured imagination, incongruously assigning intention and appetite to iron and steam (311). Yet the demon engine is more than the creature of his depressed fancy. To some degree it represents a fusion of animal and machine, where the mechanical cannot be understood in opposition to the emotional, 7 or where humans assume the characteristics of self-regulating machines. Mr. Dombey looks out of his carriage window, it is never in his thoughts that the monster who has brought him there has let the light of day in on these things: not made or caused them" (312). The train-seemingly alive, seizing the scene with the help of active verbs that allow it to roar and yell and tear and drink, demonstrate perseverance and exultation, and hurtle human bodies at unnatural speed through landscapes within which they now have almost no immersive experience-is not merely likened to but is itself the source of the sensory upheaval that amplifies Dombey's bleak thoughts. As such, it is also revelatory;
it casts light on changes that are otherwise visible only at a scale that human consciousness cannot grasp: the evacuation of the premodern landscape, the new disparities of wealth that industrialization has created, and the vanishing of traditional modes of production. To the extent that narrative can capture such revelations, it makes new modes of human perception possible. 
Sympathy in the Serious Novel
In Dickens's writing, our perception and recognition of a vast arena of interrelated events is made possible by allowing the perspectives, passions, and motives of non-humans to jostle among those of human beings; in Eliot's novels, the wide web of sympathy that enables moral life can paradoxically crush the human psyche. What Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth has described in Eliot's conception of moral sympathy as the "mutual influence of dissimilar destinies" and Of course, Eliot's teasing out of human connections and relations with regard to a non-human entity is more concentrated on the institution of the railway than on its machines. Moreover, in Middlemarch (1871-72), it has been noticed, the railway is at once something that involves a concrete historical web of actors and a "preindustrial" organic entity that "breeds" and suffers "infant struggles," and whose figuration is in part an effort to hold on to the experiential and the local in the face of the ever-increasing abstraction of value in economic-industrial modernity (Givner 228) . In this combination, the railway becomes a repository of human sympathy in which face-to-face recognition of the joys and sufferings of others can be experientially broadened into a wider world of institutionally driven connections.
Elsewhere in Eliot's writing, however, the non-human is what stands at the limits of sympathy, and the task of the narrative is to push against these limits and draw the objects that lie outside them into its fold. This, for her, is the difference between greater and lesser minds. At one extreme lies a form of sympathy so exquisite that it can distill spiritual meaning and destiny out of "unnumbered impressions"-Mordecai's prophetic gift in Daniel Deronda. At the other extreme lie characters like the self-serving aristocratic Grandcourt, whose instincts are so narrow as to be like those of an insect, or (strangely kin to him) the cataleptic Silas Marner. The greatness of psychological realism, then, lies in its capacity to imitate the expansive mind: to create a "narrow portal" that will filter and make meaningful an "inrush" of perceptions (Deronda 471). At the same time, a single consciousness may not be able to endure such understanding: in Middlemarch, for instance, the narrator famously describes how "if we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence" (192) . The price of truly grasping the social and its fantastic relay of human and non-human actors, in other words, may be emotional disintegration. AUTUMN 2017 This paradox at the heart of Eliot's novels-that sympathy is at once the key to sociability and also a force that may de-animate the human-anticipates the non-anthropocentric, object-oriented focus of much current critical thought.
Latour describes "the network of individuals, the welter of equipment, the pullulations of occasions" that make up the stream of human and non-human events constituting the social (Style 24). But others have proposed more specifically how sympathy diminishes the human. Blakey Vermeule, for instance, describes how literary forms enhance sympathetic feeling and sociality by engaging in "mind blindness" (68), an opacity in the depiction of character that temporarily de-animates and dehumanizes the social world in order to exercise the reader's mind-reading skills. Hence, strangely, the deliberate shrinking of other minds into objects lies at the core of social feeling. In a similar vein, Rae Greiner reveals how novelistic realism captures the very failure of minds to grasp the content of other minds; it is only by preserving the distance between self and other that social order becomes representable. 11 And Jonathan Lamb has proposed that acts of sympathetic kindness are possible only with the crushing of the ego and utter abjection of the human subject. 12 These accounts of sympathy point to the speculative nature of realism: as Ian Bogost has put it, objects become accessible to thinking subjects only through an "alien phenomenology" (40). Neither fully accessible nor infinitely removed from us, objects reveal only those portions of themselves that are in dynamic relation with other objects or parts of objects, including ourselves. Otherwise, they are secret and unreadable. As a mode of speculative realism, sympathy is full of peril for the autonomous subject and its confident mapping of a horizon of objects.
The anti-humanism of the great novel is therefore found in the way that it ranges across so many characters, objects, places, and events, and through so many pages. Whether concentrated on the discovery of a much larger world than the ego can ever manage or manipulate, like the awareness that throws Gwendolen Harleth into a cataleptic fit, or narratively pulled away from human consciousness to the exhilarated "mind" of an object, as in Dombey and Son, the great novel's unravelling of human autonomy is tied to its depiction of a network. This is the vast web of entities through which the human and non-human are imbricated, or through which sympathy routes minds to other minds even as it humbles thought in the face of what it cannot grasp and subdue.
The Made Man and the Machine
Erewhon has none of the webby realism of a great novel. Indeed, in his preface to the revised edition, Butler expresses astonishment that this early novel received the recognition it did given its "literary inelegancies" (xv) and Reviewers had mixed responses. The Examiner suggested that the novel "recalls the memorable performance of Gulliver's Travels," but went on to say that it was "too abstract, too thickly studded with argumentative expostulation and not sufficiently translated into the concrete forms of daily life to rival . . .
Swift's satire" ("Erewhon" 432). The Athenaeum condemned it as a "slovenly"
and "inconsistent" satire (492). The Saturday Review praised "a good many ingenious remarks and some caustic hits in the book," but complained that "on the whole the allegory seems too farfetched and complicated to have the desirable brilliancy of effect" (508). Without any real depth of characterization or some modicum of realism with which to anchor the narrative, these reviews concurred, readers could not be engaged long enough to laugh at the absurdity of foreign manners, let alone to recognize them as their own.
Yet this poverty of character and narrowness of reach can serve as a route into the rather complex colonial politics of the novel. One formal way of reading Erewhon as critical toward colonialism is through its sophisticated manipulation of genre. As David Amigoni has pointed out, the novel uses satiric defamiliarization to challenge assumptions about sovereignty and the human that come from Darwinian evolutionism as much as from racial anthropology. Yet Erewhon also reminds us that in the relationship between technology and empire a new kind of human subject appears whose autonomy, value, and power over others-especially other humans-is predicated on the antihumanism of the machine age. Read this way, the novel does not celebrate the collapse of human-non-human distinctions at all. Instead it recognizes in that collapse how the dethroning of discretely human agency is bound up with acts of enclosure and dispossession brought about by the expansionist pressures and technological affordances of industrial capitalism. Although far from overtly anti-colonial, Erewhon's famously hard-to-pin-down satire in combination with its "poor" form, or literary "minorness," indicates ambivalence toward the richer narratives that entwine humans and non-human objects within immense social networks.
Strikingly, given that the novel establishes a colonial setting that it later seems to forget, reviewers either ignored or, like the Athenaeum, outright praised the opening chapters that precede the narrator's discovery of Erewhon. These chapters, which unabashedly applaud the heroic settler spirit, describe Higgs's experiences on a Canterbury sheep farm and his journey into the mountains in search of new grazing land. Based largely on Butler's own experiences as a short-term colonist in New Zealand between 1860 and 1864, this section draws on real events from settler history. In the 1850s, the Crown opened "waste" lands for farming, a signature act of enclosure in the new colony. Although most of the available runs had been spoken for by 1860, remoter areas, particularly further west in the MacKenzie country, held out the promise of yetundiscovered grazing land. Higgs, like Butler, becomes an explorer in this region in hopes that "if I could only find workable country, I might stock it with borrowed capital, and consider myself a made man" ("A First Year" 7).
Like Butler, too, he proves to be a temporary resident of the colony, what James Smithies calls a "transnational entrepreneur" (211). According to Smithies, the transnational mobility of middle-class Victorians-the quite rapid movement that many undertook back and forth between metropole and peripherybelies the too frequent assumption that Butler "was living in a frontier society consisting solely of pastoralism and wide open spaces" (212). By the 1860s, New
Zealand was both industrialized-a railway system, a telegraph line, and a major bridge were all in the process of construction in the Canterbury settlement when Butler arrived-and integrated into a global economy in which sheep's wool, in particular, had considerable currency. 16 Despite having roughed it in the wilderness, the made man is profoundly embedded in a highly technologized imperial economy.
Also belonging to these early sections is the novel's lone Māori character, Higgs's unreliable guide, improbably named "Chowbok." Chowbok is a creation of Victorian racial anthropology: "grotesque," "fiendish," excessively superstitious, and close to primitive nature (13). His character signifies a familiar distinction between the fully human landed settler and the subhuman or nature-bound landless native, a false characterization that in turn serves to justify enclosure. This characterization also invokes particular events in New
Zealand's colonial history, specifically Māori/Pākehā (settler) relations and the expropriation of Māori land. From the 1840s on, large, loosely demarcated areas that were not heavily cultivated by Māori became the subject of systematic blanket purchases wherein the Māori claim was resigned in return for trifles.
These purchases were legitimized through negotiations with chiefs that Crown officials erroneously asserted were speaking for all claimants. Māori-whose concept of ownership and land rights was more complex and dynamic than the European one of fixed, individual property-assumed that they still had hunting and fishing privileges on these lands until the fencing of plots and the draining of swamps and wetlands made these impossible. 17 At the very time that Who shall deny that one who can tack on a special train to his identity, and go wheresoever he will whensoever he pleases, is more highly organized than he who, should he wish for the same power, might wish for the wings of a bird with an equal chance of getting them; and whose legs are his only means of locomotion? (270) Although he suffers no Gulliver-like humiliation at the end of Erewhon, Higgs too becomes the object of his author's satire as the profit-lust of the made man, harnessed to the networking technologies of imperial commerce, so clearly feeds on the primitive, sluggish bodies of the poor and the colonized. suggests, alerts us to the value of "good" texts, those that "take into account at least some of the many quirks of their recalcitrant objects" (125). Above all, a good text "traces a network" in which every participant, human or non-human, is an actor (128). Yet through its complex satiric layering, Erewhon offers a caution. In our enthusiasm for the great novel's exquisite tracing of network and its patient attention to the non-human, Butler warns, we may forget to read for histories of dispossession and dehumanization in which networks themselves remain far from innocent.
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